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Introduction 
 
 
The Future of the Minsk Agreements 
Press for Implementation and Support Sanctions 
Susan Stewart 
The Minsk agreements are currently the principal instrument for achieving a lasting 
settlement in the occupied regions of eastern Ukraine. Moscow and Kyiv, however, 
are showing little enthusiasm for implementing the associated package of measures. 
Unless this changes by the summer, the European Union would be ill-advised to lift or 
relax its economic sanctions against Russia. As well as harming the Union’s political 
credibility, such a step would encourage Russia both to expand its influence in the 
post-Soviet space and to continue its attempts at dividing the EU. 
 
The Minsk agreements consist of a protocol 
from September 2014 and a package of 
measures from February 2015. They were 
prepared under OSCE auspices and signed 
by Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and the sepa-
ratists in the so-called “people’s republics” 
of eastern Ukraine. The process is moni-
tored by Germany, France, Ukraine and 
Russia, whose representatives meet regu-
larly in the “Normandy format”. 
For over a year now, implementation of 
the Minsk agreements has failed to progress 
beyond partial fulfilment of individual items. 
In the meantime, the European Union’s 
unity over sanctions against Russia has 
been gradually eroding, and there is some 
doubt as to whether they will be extended 
again in the summer. Given that the EU 
has made complete implementation of the 
agreements a condition for lifting sanc-
tions, it may soon find itself with a cred-
ibility problem. 
A Tricky EU Context 
The European Council Conclusions of 19–20 
March 2015 state: “The European Council 
agreed that the duration of the restrictive 
measures against the Russian Federation, 
adopted on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 
8 September 2014, should be clearly linked 
to the complete implementation of the 
Minsk agreements, bearing in mind that 
this is only foreseen by 31 December 2015.” 
After the deadline was missed, the parties 
extended it into 2016. 
Within the European Union, Germany 
has taken on the greatest responsibility for 
achieving a resolution in eastern Ukraine. 
As well as playing a key role in the Norman-
dy format together with France, Germany 
also assumed the OSCE Chairmanship in 
January 2016, and is thus now integrated 
even more closely into the existing conflict-
resolution mechanisms. The OSCE’s Special 
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine is keeping 
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the situation on the ground under per-
manent observation, and the OSCE is also 
responsible for the contact group in which 
talks on implementation of the Minsk deci-
sions occur. Under this framework it should 
be possible to stabilise the situation in the 
occupied parts of the Donbas and improve 
humanitarian conditions, thereby paving 
the way for implementation of political 
measures such as local elections and ele-
ments of decentralisation. 
To date only one of the thirteen Minsk 
items has been fully implemented: the 
work of the contact group has been inten-
sified. The ceasefire in eastern Ukraine 
remains fragile, the withdrawal of heavy 
weapons has been only partial and the 
exchange of prisoners has yet to be com-
pleted. Other agreed steps are also still 
pending: neither has a special status been 
instituted for parts of the Donbas, nor have 
elections been held in the occupied areas. 
And Russia has yet to hand control of the 
border back to Ukraine. In view of the lack 
of progress in the Minsk framework, the EU 
member-states decided in December 2015 
to extend their economic sanctions against 
Russia for a further six months. 
However, the European Union’s collective 
resolve on sanctions seems to be weaken-
ing. On the one hand, the arguments that 
made certain countries sceptical from the 
outset continue to be advanced. The EU’s 
sanctions and Moscow’s counter-measures 
are causing trade and investment losses 
to firms and certain economic sectors in 
a number of member-states. And Ukraine 
aside, even if many European actors are 
quite dissatisfied with Russia’s role in Syria, 
most continue to regard the Russian Federa-
tion as an important international partner. 
Generally, many EU states find the poten-
tial consequences of stricter isolation of 
Russia unpredictable and alarming. 
New factors also play a part. With east-
ern Ukraine remaining relatively calm in 
recent months, Russia’s destabilising role 
there has slipped out of the focus of Euro-
pean attention, especially as the refugee 
crisis has come to overshadow most other 
issues. The Kremlin has also succeeded in 
strengthening pro-Russian voices in certain 
EU member-states by supporting right-wing 
forces, which have been gaining additional 
ground as a result of growing opposition to 
the recent influx of migrants. Finally, there 
is widespread disappointment with Ukraine, 
since Kyiv has been slow to conduct impor-
tant reforms and is experiencing domestic 
political instability. As a result, there are 
numerous calls emanating from business, 
politics and society in various member-
states (including Germany) for a relaxation 
or lifting of sanctions, despite the clear 
language of the Council Conclusions. The 
French elites are divided on this question, 
while Italy, Austria, Greece and Hungary 
fundamentally question the point of the 
measures. 
Russia: Unyielding 
Moscow is plainly seeking to have the sanc-
tions relaxed, or better still lifted. But it 
wishes to achieve this without having to ful-
fil its Minsk obligations. Instead the Krem-
lin is pursuing a three-pronged approach. 
Firstly, it is seeking to present itself as a 
constructive actor. At the beginning of 2016 
the Russians made a series of moves that 
many observers interpreted as signs of a 
new willingness to make progress on im-
plementing Minsk. These included the 
appointment of Boris Gryzlov – former 
speaker of the Duma and today a member 
of the Russian Security Council – to repre-
sent Russia in the OSCE-led contact group. 
At the same time Moscow responded posi-
tively to a meeting between Victoria Nuland, 
US Assistant Secretary of State, and Putin 
adviser Vladislav Surkov in Kaliningrad on 
15 January, where possible next steps in 
the Minsk process were discussed in detail. 
There is, however, no reason to believe 
that Russia has altered its objectives in the 
Ukraine conflict. There has in fact been no 
positive shift in Moscow’s behaviour (or 
that of the Russian-controlled separatists) 
with respect to Minsk. Furthermore, Russia 
has taken military measures which would 
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allow the fighting in the Donbas to resume 
at any time. Germany and the EU must 
therefore assume that Russia is still seeking 
to destabilise Ukraine and remains unwill-
ing to relinquish control of the occupied 
areas in the east. 
Secondly, the Russians never tire of 
repeating that Ukraine is not fulfilling its 
own Minsk obligations. The Kremlin con-
centrates particularly on the requirement 
to grant the occupied territories in the Don-
bas a special status in the Ukrainian con-
stitution, presenting Ukraine as the main 
obstacle to implementation of the Minsk 
package. Thirdly, Moscow is seeking to 
deepen fault lines within the EU to a point 
where consensus on extending the sanc-
tions can no longer be achieved in July. 
Germany is currently one of the targets 
of this policy. The Russian international 
media campaign claiming (falsely) that a 
girl possessing both German and Russian 
citizenship had been raped by refugees in 
Berlin is just one example of Moscow’s 
attempts to discredit Germany and depict 
it as a dangerous country with incompetent 
security organs. One of Russia’s goals here 
is to make life difficult for the German 
government by sowing discord in society. 
Ultimately, Moscow would like to under-
mine Germany’s dominant role within the 
European Union, in order to increase the 
influence of more strongly pro-Russian 
member-states. 
Moscow is thus attempting to provide 
the European Union with arguments for 
relaxing or lifting sanctions, even though 
Minsk is still far from full implementation. 
One outcome of such a course would be a 
scenario in which the situation in eastern 
Ukraine remains unresolved, while Russia 
no longer has any incentive to agree to 
compromises within the Minsk framework. 
In that event Russia’s politically and eco-
nomically strengthened position would be 
likely to lead Moscow to make new demands. 
The Kremlin would also feel that its ap-
proach of fomenting strife within the Euro-
pean Union had been vindicated. 
Ukraine: Foot-dragging 
For several months Ukrainian politicians 
created the impression that realising two 
points of the Minsk agreements lay within 
reach: a constitutional amendment to allow 
decentralisation and a law on local elections 
in the occupied areas. But since the begin-
ning of 2016 the Ukrainians have been in-
sisting that Russia and the separatists must 
do more to observe the first part of the 
agreements: ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy 
weapons and exchange of prisoners. Until 
these points have been fulfilled, they argue, 
Ukraine cannot meet its ensuing obliga-
tions. It is indeed hard to imagine how a 
special status could be introduced or an 
election held according to OSCE standards 
in the unstable context of the so-called 
people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. 
Credible steps to improve security in these 
areas could boost Ukrainian confidence 
that Russia is genuinely committed to the 
Minsk framework. 
Currently, however, a climate of mistrust 
of Moscow prevails in Ukraine, with the 
measures needed to implement Minsk con-
sequently rejected by large segments of the 
political elite and the society. This applies 
most of all to the question of a special status 
for the Donbas. Some fear that a loosely for-
mulated constitutional amendment would 
leave Ukraine powerless to control how 
that status was concretely implemented. 
The situation is exacerbated by severe ten-
sions within the government coalition, 
which has essentially collapsed. It is cor-
respondingly difficult to achieve a broad 
consensus on sensitive legislative proposals. 
In relation to local elections in the 
occupied areas, there are growing fears in 
Kyiv that the OSCE could water down its 
standards in order to obtain a recognised 
election result to advance the Minsk pro-
cess. The state of discussions in the contact 
group shows that positions on the con-
ditions necessary for elections to be held 
are still miles apart. In the current precari-
ous domestic political situation, the chances 
of achieving a rapid Ukrainian consensus 
on the Minsk framework are poor. Even if a 
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reshuffle were to produce a more reform-
oriented government, it would not neces-
sarily be any more willing to implement 
the agreements. Moreover, some Ukrainian 
politicians appear to regard a blockade 
of Minsk as insurance that EU sanctions 
against Russia will be upheld. 
Parallel Tracks 
Despite its dual role as OSCE Chair and a 
key actor in the Normandy format, Germany 
possesses only limited possibilities for influ-
encing the behaviour of Russia and Ukraine 
with respect to the Minsk agreements. The 
signs do not currently point towards rapid 
implementation. It would therefore be 
advisable for Berlin to expend more energy 
within the European Union to build sup-
port for extending the economic sanctions. 
The German government could com-
plement that approach by stepping up its 
targeted pressure on Kyiv to institute rule-
of-law reforms, working on the assumption 
that successful reforms would make it 
easier to rally support for Ukraine within 
the EU. And the sanctions against Russia 
should also be understood as a form of sup-
port for Ukraine, in the sense that they 
increase the cost of Russia’s destabilisation 
of the Donbas. 
It is also important to avoid abandoning 
the sphere of information to Russian and 
Ukrainian actors. Instead an assessment of 
the implementation of the Minsk measures 
needs to be generated using the most objec-
tive possible sources and discussed on this 
basis with European partners. The data on 
the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy 
weapons gathered by the OSCE mission 
could be useful, as could information from 
organisations such as the International 
Crisis Group, which possesses important 
insights into the situation in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions. This would create a 
partial counterweight to Russian propa-
ganda in particular, which is increasingly 
pervasive and perfidious. 
It could also be useful to hold a struc-
tured discussion about how the economic 
losses caused by (counter-)sanctions could 
be minimised through a coordinated diver-
sion of trade flows. Such a dialogue could 
also include third states such as Turkey. 
None of this would in the slightest 
exclude further talks in the Minsk frame-
work. Despite the ongoing difficulties with 
implementation of the agreements, the 
existing combination of the Minsk docu-
ments, the Normandy format meetings, 
and the OSCE-led contact group appears 
to be the best option for pursuing conflict 
settlement in the current environment. 
While there have been numerous mentions 
of a potential “Minsk III” or a negotiation 
format including a different constellation 
of actors, it is unclear how an effective tran-
sition to such a format might be conducted, 
or why such changes would make a reso-
lution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine 
more likely. The measures recommended 
above are thus conceived as a parallel track, 
to help ensure the European Union’s con-
sistency and credibility in the event that 
the Minsk process fails to achieve clear pro-
gress in the coming months. In view of the 
present calculations of the parties to the 
conflict – and these include Russia, despite 
its protestations to the contrary – this is 
unfortunately to be expected. 
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